Rick Spence

Rick Spence · 30,809 词 · 查看原文 ↗
历史与文明音乐与艺术政治与社会心理与人性生物与进化
📋 章节目录
0:00 Introduction · 介绍
0:37 KGB and CIA · 克格勃和中央情报局
14:54 Okhrana, Cheka, NKVD · 奥赫拉纳、契卡、内务人民委员部
30:26 CIA spies vs KGB spies · 中央情报局间谍与克格勃间谍
37:02 Assassinations and mind control · 暗杀和精神控制
43:56 Jeffrey Epstein · 杰弗里·爱泼斯坦
50:48 Bohemian Grove · 波西米亚丛林
1:02:42 Occultism · 神秘主义
1:13:53 Nazi party and Thule society · 纳粹党和图勒协会
1:54:11 Protocols of the Elders of Zion · 锡安长老会的议定书
2:27:16 Charles Manson · 查尔斯·曼森
2:54:03 Zodiac Killer · 十二宫杀手
3:04:57 Illuminati · 光明会
3:12:21 Secret societies · 秘密社团
🔑 关键词
rickspencegoingdonjewsgermangotintelligencemansonorganizationwholecallednamerussianhumanwarsecretgermanypartycourse
💬 精彩语录
"Well, because we know so little, we tend to go by beliefs. So we believe in this. We believe in that. You believe that your cult leader is the answer to everything. And it seems to be very, very easy to get people to believe things. And then what happens is that whether or not those beliefs have any real basis in reality, they begin to influence your actions. So here again, regrettably in some ways to bring it back to the Nazis, what were the Nazis convinced of? They were convinced that Jews were basically evil aliens. That’s what it comes down to. They weren’t really humans. There’s some sort of evil contamination which we must eradicate. And they set out to do that."
嗯,因为我们所知甚少,所以我们倾向于相信信念。所以我们相信这一点。我们相信这一点。你相信你的邪教领袖是一切问题的答案。让人们相信事情似乎非常非常容易。然后发生的事情是,无论这些信念在现实中是否有任何真正的基础,它们都会开始影响你的行为。那么在这里,遗憾的是,在某些方面将其带回纳粹分子,纳粹分子相信什么?他们确信犹太人基本上是邪恶的外星人。归根结底就是这样。他们不是真正的人类。我们必须根除某种邪恶的污染。他们开始这样做。
— Rick Spence (03:21:09)
"To this day however, you will find people who will insist that it’s actually true because they desperately want it to be true. But this is, I think the milieu that, I like that word apparently that this comes out of, and this is this whole kind of unhealthy mix. So France to me is the only place that in the decade preceding it, that something like this would be concocted. So it was either created by some sort of unknown person there. But I still think that even though he dies in like 1879, that in Maurice Joly’s troubled career, he went from being an opponent of French Emperor, Napoleon III, which is what the whole dialogues was written against."
然而直到今天,你会发现有人坚持认为这确实是真的,因为他们迫切希望它是真的。但我认为这就是我喜欢这个词的背景,这就是整个不健康的组合。所以对我来说,法国是在之前的十年里唯一一个能够炮制出这样的东西的地方。所以它要么是由那里的某个不知名的人创建的。但我仍然认为,尽管他去世于1879年左右,但在莫里斯·乔利坎坷的职业生涯中,他从法国皇帝拿破仑三世的反对者变成了整个对话所反对的对象。
— Rick Spence (02:05:21)
"Well, I guess on one level I’m comforted that there’s somebody actually making decisions as opposed to, I mean, what do you want? Do you want chaos or do you want everything kind of rigidly controlled? And I don’t put much stock in the idea that there actually is some small group of people running everything, because if they were, it would operate more efficiently. I do think that there are various disparate groups of people who think that they’re running things or try to, and that’s what concerns me more than anything else."
好吧,我想在某种程度上,我感到欣慰的是,有人真正做出了决定,而不是,我的意思是,你想要什么?你想要混乱还是想要一切都受到严格控制?我不太相信实际上有一小群人在管理一切,因为如果是他们的话,它的运作会更有效。我确实认为有各种各样不同的人认为他们正在管理或试图管理事物,这就是我最关心的事情。
— Rick Spence (03:19:07)
"So it’s a way of manipulating this. Then finally, we come to the E. That I think is the most important, ego. Sometimes people spy or betray because of the egotistical satisfaction that they receive, the sheer kind of Machiavellian joy in deceit. An example of that would be Kim Philby, one of the Cambridge five. Now, Philby was a communist, and he would argue that he always saw himself as serving the communist cause. But he also made this statement, I think it’s in the preface to his autobiography, and he says, one never looks twice at the offer of service in elite force. He’s talking about his recruitment by the NKVD in the 1930s, and he was absolutely chuffed by that."
所以这是操纵这个的一种方法。最后,我们来到E。我认为这是最重要的,自我。有时,人们监视或背叛是因为他们获得了自私的满足,即欺骗中纯粹的马基雅维利式的快乐。剑桥五人之一的金·菲尔比就是一个例子。现在,菲尔比是一名共产主义者,他会争辩说,他始终认为自己是为共产主义事业服务的。但他也发表了这样的声明,我认为这是在他的自传的序言中,他说,人们永远不会再看精锐部队的服役机会。他正在谈论 1930 年代他被内务人民委员部招募的事,他对此非常高兴。
— Rick Spence (00:27:23)
"And I think that it just has to do with the changes that have taken place during the war. One of the things that people began looking for was that why was there a war? And we’ve just had this whole disastrous war and the world has been turned upside down. So there has to be some kind of explanation for that. I don’t know. And one of the things this offered to, see there’s this evil plan, there’s this evil plan that has been put into motion, and this could possibly explain what’s taking place. The reason with the protocols were, I think widely bought then and why they still are in many ways is the same reason that the Taxil hoax I was talking about was. Because it told a story that people wanted to believe."
我认为这与战争期间发生的变化有关。人们开始寻找的一件事是为什么会发生战争?我们刚刚经历了这场灾难性的战争,世界已经天翻地覆。所以必须对此有某种解释。我不知道。这提供的一件事是,看看有这个邪恶的计划,有这个邪恶的计划已经付诸实施,这可能可以解释正在发生的事情。我认为这些协议当时被广泛购买的原因是,为什么它们在很多方面仍然如此,这与我所说的塔西尔骗局的原因是一样的。因为它讲述了一个人们愿意相信的故事。
— Rick Spence (02:10:49)
🎙️ 完整对话(374 条)
Lex Fridman (00:00:00)
Most people, most of the time are polite, cooperative, and kind until they’re not.
大多数人在大多数时候都是有礼貌、合作和友善的,直到他们不再这样做为止。
Lex Fridman (00:00:13)
The following is a conversation with Rick Spence, a historian specializing in the history of intelligence agencies, espionage, secret societies, conspiracies, the occult and military history. This is the Lex Fridman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now dear friends, here’s Rick Spence. KGB and CIA
以下是与里克·斯宾塞(Rick Spence)的对话,他是一位历史学家,专门研究情报机构、间谍、秘密结社、阴谋、神秘学和军事历史。这是莱克斯·弗里德曼播客。为了支持它,请在说明中查看我们的赞助商。亲爱的朋友们,这是里克·斯彭斯。克格勃和中央情报局
Lex Fridman (00:00:38)
You have written and lectured about serial killers, secret societies, cults and intelligence agencies. So we can basically begin at any of these fascinating topics, but let’s begin with intelligence agencies. Which has been the most powerful intelligence agency in history?
您撰写并演讲过有关连环杀手、秘密社团、邪教和情报机构的内容。所以我们基本上可以从这些令人着迷的话题开始,但让我们从情报机构开始。历史上最强大的情报机构是哪个?
Lex Fridman (00:00:55)
The most powerful intelligence agency in history. It’s an interesting question. I’d say probably in terms of historical longevity and consistency of performance that the Russian Intelligence Services. Notice I didn’t say the KGB specifically, but the Russian Intelligence Services, going back to the Czarist period are consistently pretty good. Not infallible, none of them are. Of course, there’s a common Western way of looking at anything Russian. Very often, I think it’s still the case Russians are viewed in one or two ways. Either they are Bumbling idiots or they’re diabolically clever, no sort of middle ground. You can find both of those examples in this.
史上最强大的情报机构。这是一个有趣的问题。我想说的可能是俄罗斯情报部门的历史悠久和表现的一致性。请注意,我并没有具体说克格勃,但俄罗斯情报部门,可以追溯到沙皇时期,一直都相当不错。并非绝对正确,没有一个是绝对正确的。当然,有一个
Lex Fridman (00:01:49)
So what I mean by that is that if you’re looking at the modern SVR or FSB, which are just two different organizations that used to be part of the one big KGB or the KGB or its predecessors, the Checka, you’re really going back to the late 19th century and the Imperial Russian Intelligence Security Service, generally known as the Okhrana or Okhrana.
所以我的意思是,如果你看到现代的 SVR 或 FSB,它们只是两个不同的组织,曾经是克格勃或克格勃或其前身 Checka 的一部分,你真的会回到 19 世纪末的俄罗斯帝国情报安全局,通常被称为 Okhrana 或 Okhrana。
Rick Spence (00:02:17)
It’s really the Department of Police, the special Corps of Gendarmes. Their primary job was protecting the imperial regime and protecting it against imperial or other interior enemies, Revolutionaries for the most part. They got very, very good at that by co-opting people within those movements, infiltrating and recruiting informers, [inaudible 00:02:41] provocateurs. In fact, they excelled at the [inaudible 00:02:45] provocateur.
这实际上是警察局,特种宪兵队。他们的主要工作是保护帝国政权并保护其免受帝国或其他内部敌人的侵害,其中大部分是革命者。他们非常非常擅长在这些运动中拉拢人员、渗透和招募告密者、[听不清 00:02:41] 挑衅者。事实上,他们在这方面表现出色
Rick Spence (00:02:46)
Person who placed aside an organization to cause trouble, usually maneuver them into a position of leadership, and they provoke actions that can then allow you to crack down on that is many sort of lure or bring the target organization into any legal or open status that it can be more effectively suppressed. They were very good at that. So good that by the early 20th century in the years preceding the Russian Revolution in 1917, they had effectively infiltrated every radical party, Bolsheviks, Menchaviks, SRs, great and small, and placed people in positions of influence and leadership to the point that arguably that is, you can debate this, that I think in the whole, they could largely dictate what those parties did.
搁置一个组织来制造麻烦的人,通常会操纵他们担任领导职务,然后他们挑起行动,然后你可以打击这种诱惑,或者使目标组织进入任何合法或公开的状态,以便更有效地镇压。他们非常擅长这一点。太好了,到了 20 世纪初期的前几年
Rick Spence (00:03:42)
Nothing was discussed at any central committee meeting of any revolutionary group that the Okhrana wasn’t immediately aware of, and they often had people in positions to influence what those decisions were. Of course, that raises an interesting question, is that if they were that good and they had infiltrated and effectively controlled most of the opposition, then how did the regime get overthrown by revolutionaries? The answer to that is that it wasn’t overthrown by revolutionaries, it was overthrown by politicians. That would then take us into a detour into Russian history. But I’ll just leave it with this. If you look at 1917 and you look closely, this is one of the things I’d always tell my students is that there are two Russian revolutions in 1917. There’s the first one in March or February, depending on your calendar, that overthrows Nicholas II. Revolutionaries are really not involved with that.
任何革命团体的中央委员会会议上都没有讨论任何奥克拉纳没有立即意识到的内容,而且他们经常派人影响这些决定。当然,这就提出了一个有趣的问题,如果他们真有那么好,已经渗透并有效控制了大部分反对派,那么政权是如何被推翻的呢?
Rick Spence (00:04:40)
Bolsheviks are nowhere to be seen. Trotsky and Lenin are nowhere to be seen. They have nothing to do with that. That has to do effectively with a political conspiracy within the Russian parliament, the Duma. To unseat and emperor, they thought was bungling the war and was essentially a loser to begin with. It was a coup d’etat, a parliamentary coup d’etat. The temporary or provisional government that that revolution put in power was the one overthrown by Lenin eight months later. That government was essentially one dominated by moderate socialists. It was a government that very quickly sort of turned to the left. The guy we associate with that is Alexander Kerensky. Alexander Kerensky was a Russian socialist, a politician. He was the quasi-dictator of that regime. He’s the person, not the Tsar, who’s overthrown by Lenin. So the revolutionaries then did not prove to be the fatal threat to the Tsarist regime.
布尔什维克无处可见。托洛茨基和列宁却不见踪影。他们与此无关。这实际上与俄罗斯议会杜马内部的政治阴谋有关。他们认为,推翻皇帝就是搞砸了战争,本质上就是一个失败者。这是一场政变,一场议会政变。临时或临时政府
Rick Spence (00:05:46)
It was the Tsarist political system itself that did that. What then transpired was that the Okhrana and its method, and many of its agents then immediately segued over into the new Soviet Security Service. So one of the first things that Lenin did in December of 1917, within a month of seizing power since the hold on power was tenuous at best, was that while you were going to need some kind of organization to infiltrate and suppress those pesky counter-revolutionaries and foreign imperialists and all of the other enemies that we have. So the extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution and sabotage the Cheka was formed. You put a veteran Bolshevik, Felix Dzerzhinsky at the head of that someone you could politically rely upon, but Dzerzhinsky built his organization essentially out of the Okhrana. There were all of these informers sitting around with nothing to do, and they were employed in the early twenties. The kind of rank-and-file of the Cheka might’ve been 80 to 90% former Imperial officials. Those were gradually decreased over time.
这是沙皇政治制度本身造成的。随后发生的事情是,国家安全局及其方法,以及它的许多特工立即转入新成立的苏联安全部门。因此,列宁在 1917 年 12 月夺取政权后一个月内所做的第一件事就是,尽管你需要某种组织,因为对权力的控制充其量也很脆弱。
Lex Fridman (00:07:02)
So why would they do that? Well, they were professionals. They also needed to eat and things were somewhat precarious. So if your job is to be an agent provocateur, if your job is to infiltrate targeted organizations and lead them astray, you do that for whoever pays you. That’s part of the professionalism, which goes in. Under the Soviets, the Soviet Intelligence Services are also very good at that. They’re very good at infiltrating people into opposing organizations. I guess the one example I would give to demonstrate that at the Cambridge five, the British traders from the Soviet standpoint, heroes who were recruited, most notably Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald McClain, Anthony Blunt, and there may have been, well more than five, but that wasn’t bad out of just Cambridge.
那么他们为什么要这么做呢?嗯,他们是专业人士。他们也需要吃饭,事情有些不稳定。因此,如果你的工作是成为一名特务挑衅者,如果你的工作是渗透到目标组织并引导他们误入歧途,那么无论谁付钱给你,你都会这样做。这是专业精神的一部分。在苏联时期,苏联情报部门也非常擅长
Rick Spence (00:07:59)
Then placing those people in high positions, the ultimate goal, of course, is to get your people into positions of leadership and influence in the opposing intelligence service. So they did. Of course, it all fell apart and they ended up in …Philby ended up living the last part of his life in exile in Moscow, but they got their money’s worth out of him. You can also find this in KGB infiltration, the CIA, the FBI, the Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanson cases. Of course, we were infiltrating. By we, I mean the Americans in the West managed to infiltrate our moles as well. But if it came down, someone could dispute this. But I would think if you were going to come down to kind of like who had the most moles Super Bowl, probably the Soviets would come somewhat ahead of that.
然后把这些人放在高位,最终的目标当然是让你的人在对方情报部门中担任领导和影响力的职位。他们就这么做了。当然,一切都崩溃了,他们最终……菲尔比在莫斯科流亡,度过了生命的最后一段时光,但他们从他身上得到了值得的钱。你也可以在克格勃渗透中找到这一点,
Lex Fridman (00:08:57)
So the scale of the infiltration, the number of people and the skill of it, is there a case to be made that the Okhrana and the Chaka orchestrated both the components of the Russian Revolution as you described them?
那么,渗透的规模、人员数量和技巧,是否有理由证明 Okhrana 和 Chaka 精心策划了您所描述的俄罗斯革命的两个组成部分?
Rick Spence (00:09:14)
Well, there’s an interesting question for me. There are all kinds of questions about this. One of the questions is whether or not Lenin was an Okhrana agent. Okay, I’ve just said heresy. I’ll do that quite often. I am a heretic and proud of it.
嗯,对我来说有一个有趣的问题。对此有各种各样的疑问。问题之一是列宁是否是奥克拉纳的特工。好吧,我刚才说的是异端邪说。我会经常这样做。我是一个异教徒并为此感到自豪。
Lex Fridman (00:09:31)
Great.
伟大的。
Lex Fridman (00:09:33)
Why would you possibly say that Lenin could have been an Okhrana agent? Well, let’s look what he managed to do. So you had, coming into the 20th century, nominally, a single Marxist movement, the Russian social Democratic Labor Party, and Bolsheviks and Mensheviks majority- ites and minority-ites are merely factions of that party. They always agreed that they were all Marxists. We all believe in dialectical materialism and the rise of were all socialists comrade. The difference was the tactical means by which one would attain this. What Lenin wanted was a militant small-scale Vanguard party. Wanted a revolution, wanted to seize power, seize control of the state.
你为什么会说列宁可能是 Okhrana 的特工?好吧,让我们看看他做了什么。因此,进入20世纪,名义上只有一个马克思主义运动,即俄罗斯社会民主工党,而布尔什维克和孟什维克的多数派和少数派只是该党的派别。他们始终一致认为自己都是马克思主义者。我们都相信d
Rick Spence (00:10:31)
Once you have the state, then you induce socialism from above. Whereas the majority of the people, the so-called Mensheviks, the minority-ites who are oddly-enough, the vast majority of the party, that’s one of the first things. How do you lose that argument? How does the minority get to grab the name? But Lenin did that. So what Lenin wanted was a conspiratorial party of committed revolutionaries that would plot and scheme and undermine and eventually seize control of the state and induce socialism from above. There were other Russian Marxists who thought that that sounded vaguely totalitarian and not really democratic and not even terribly socialist. They opposed that ineffectively from the beginning, outmaneuvered every step of the way. The Mensheviks are a case study in failure of a political organization. That too will be heresy to some people.
一旦你拥有了国家,你就可以自上而下地诱导社会主义。而大多数人,即所谓的孟什维克,奇怪的少数派,党的绝大多数,这是首要的事情之一。你怎么会输掉这场争论呢?少数人如何获得这个名字?但列宁做到了。所以列宁想要的是一个由坚定的革命者组成的阴谋党
Lex Fridman (00:11:38)
But look, they lost. So what Lenin managed to do starting around 1903, continuing under this, is he managed to divide, to take what had been a single Marxist party and split it into angry contending factions because he and his Bolsheviks run one side advocating a much more militant conspiratorial policy. The discombobulated Mensheviks were over on the other. And in between were a lot of people who really didn’t know where they stood on this. Sometimes they kind of agreed he seems to be making sense today. No, no, I don’t think he’s making sense in that day. But he managed to completely disunify this organization. Now, who could possibly have seen benefit in that the Okhrana. Now, whether or not they put him up to it, whether or not in some way they helped move him into a position of leadership or encouraged it or encouraged it through people around him, whether he was a witting or unwitting agent of the Tsar’s Secret Police, he certainly accomplished exactly what it was that they had wanted.
但你看,他们输了。因此,从 1903 年左右开始,列宁成功地做到了这一点,并继续这样做,他成功地分裂了曾经的单一马克思主义政党,并将其分裂成愤怒的相互竞争的派别,因为他和他的布尔什维克站在一边,主张更加激进的阴谋政策。另一方面,混乱的孟什维克则结束了。中间有很多人
Rick Spence (00:12:52)
I find that suspicious. It’s one of those things that it’s so convenient in a way, is that I’m not necessarily sure that was an accident. There’s also this whole question to me as to what was going on within the Okhrana itself. Now, this is one of these questions we may come to later about how intelligence agencies interact or serve the governments to which they are theoretically subordinate. They do tend to acquire a great deal of influence and power. After all, their main job is to collect information. That information could be about all kinds of things, including people within the government structure itself.
我觉得这很可疑。从某种程度上来说,这是非常方便的事情之一,就是我不一定确定这是一次意外。我也有一个关于 Okhrana 内部发生的事情的完整问题。现在,这是我们稍后可能会遇到的关于情报机构如何与它们理论上所属的政府互动或服务的问题之一。他们
Rick Spence (00:13:43)
They also know how to leverage that information in a way to get people to do what you want them to do. So an argument can be made, again, an argument, not a fact, merely an opinion, which is mostly what history is made out of opinions is that at some point between about 1900 and 1917, people within the Okhrana were playing their own game. That game took them in a direction, which meant that continued loyalty to the emperor, specifically to Nicholas II, was no longer part of that.
他们还知道如何利用这些信息来让人们做你希望他们做的事情。因此,可以再次提出一个论点,一个论点,不是事实,只是一种观点,历史主要是由观点构成的,即在大约 1900 年到 1917 年之间的某个时刻,Okhrana 内部的人们在玩自己的游戏。那场比赛把他们带向了一个方向,这意味着继续
Rick Spence (00:14:23)
To me, in a way, it seems almost during the events of 1917, that one, you had an organization that was very effective that suddenly just becomes ineffective. It doesn’t really disappear. These things don’t go away because it will reappear as the O’Chacka basically fairly quickly. But it raises the question to me as to what degree there were people within the organization who allowed events to take the course they wished. Okhrana, Cheka, NKVD
Lex Fridman (00:14:55)
I always wonder how much deliberate planning there is within an organization like Okhrana or if there’s kind of a distributed intelligence that happens.
Rick Spence (00:15:07)
Well, one of the key elements that any kind of intelligence organization or operation is compartmentalization need to know. So rarely do you have an occasion where everybody in an executive position are all brought into a big corporate meeting and we discuss all of the secret operations that are going on. No, no, you never do that. Only a very limited number of people should know about that. If you have a person who is a case officer, is controlling agency, he’s the only one that should know who those people are, possibly his immediate superiors. But no way do you want that to be common knowledge. So information within the organization itself is compartmentalized. So you don’t need everybody to be in on it. You don’t even need necessarily the people who are nominally at the top. Versus the Okhrana, the real boss of the Okhrana was the Imperial ministry of the Interior, the Minister of the Interior, in fact.
Lex Fridman (00:16:07)
But the Minister of the Interior had no real effective control over this at all. To the point was that at one point early on, they actually organized the assassination of their own boss. They have their agents among the revolutionaries kill the Minister of the Interior. He’ll just replaced by another one. He’s an Imperial bureaucrat. He’s not really part of their organization. It’s like a director of an intelligence agency appointed by the president. Maybe he’s part of the organization, maybe he isn’t. Maybe he is not one of us. So you’ve got different levels, different compartments within it. Who’s actually running the show, if anyone is, I don’t know. That’s never supposed to be apparent.
Lex Fridman (00:17:00)
Well, that’s a fascinating question. You could see this with NKVD. It’s obviously an extremely powerful organization that starts to eat itself, where everybody’s pointing fingers internally also as a way to gain more power. So the question is in organizations like that that are so-called compartmentalized, where’s the power? Where’s the center of power? Because you would think given that much power, some individual or a group of individuals will start accumulating that power. But it seems like that’s not always a trivial thing because if you get too powerful, the snake eats that person.
Rick Spence (00:17:43)
Well, if we go back again to the founder of Soviet Secret Police, Felix Dzerzhinsky dies in 1926, keels over after giving a heated speech to a party meeting. Now, the common view, what you usually read, which was key for the time, is that clearly Stalin had him whacked because anytime someone died, it was almost always that. I think a lot of times he did. But in some cases, Stalin’s probably getting blamed for things that he didn’t actually do. Dzerchinsky wasn’t even opposed to Stalin. So it’s not clear why he … but Stalin died. Obviously, he was poisoned. Something happened. It was an unnatural death. Somebody goes in for an operation, it gets a little too much anesthesia. Stalin killed them. Somebody tips over in a canoe in upstate New York, Stalin killed them. There’s actually a case about that. So that itself can be kind of useful, where every time someone dies, they think you killed them.
Rick Spence (00:18:53)
That’s kind of an interesting method of intimidation in that regard. But the suspicion is nonetheless there, Dzerzhinsk was the grand inquisitor. He was seemingly firmly in control of the organization. Of course, maybe he wasn’t. My guess would be is that if Dzerzhinsky’s death was not natural causes, that he was probably eliminated by someone within his own organization. Then you look at the people who take over his immediate successor is Vyacheslav Menzhinsky who’s really not really a secret policeman, more a kind of intellectual dilettante. But if you look behind him, is the fellow Genrikh Yagoda, and Yagoda will really manage things from behind the scenes until Menzhinsky dies in 1930.
Rick Spence (00:19:52)
Then Yagoda will hold on until he’s the victim of the purges, I think in 37 or 38. Yagoda is ambitious, murderous, and if I was going to point the finger to anybody who possibly had Dzerzhinsky whacked, it would be him. For the purposes simply of advancement. The person to look out at any kind of corporate organization is your immediate subordinate, the person who could move into your job, because more than likely, that’s exactly what they’re planning to do.
Lex Fridman (00:20:31)
Yeah, just one step away from the very top, somebody there will probably accumulate the most power. You mentioned that the various Russian intelligence agencies were good at creating agent provocateurs infiltrating the halls of power. What does it take to do that?
Rick Spence (00:20:53)
Well, there’s an interesting little acronym called MICE, M-I-C-E. It’s generally used, and it’s just the way in which you would acquire. How do you get people to work for you? Well, M stands for money. You pay them. People are greedy. They want money. If you look at Aldrich Ames, he had a very, very expensive wife with expensive tastes. So he wanted money. I is for ideology. So during, particularly in the 1920s and the 1930s, the Soviets were very effective in exploiting communists, people who wanted to serve the great cause, even though that’s initially not really what they wanted to do. Because the idea was that if you recruit agents from among, let’s say, American communists, you compromise the party because exactly what your enemies are going to say is that all communists are Soviet spies. They’re all traitors in some way. So you would really want to keep those two things separate.
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